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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§78-2a-3(2)(j)(1996). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Although the docketing statement identifies a number of issues with regard to this 
appeal, for the purpose of this brief by amicus the issue that will be addressed is whether the 
trial court erred in ruling that Trench Shoring Services, Inc. ("TSS") was entitled to recover 
from Saratoga under the Payment Bond Statute for failure to obtain a payment bond, where 
the charges TSS sought to recover were rental charges for equipment supplied to a sub-
subcontractor on the project. 
The trial court's application of the law to the undisputed facts in a summary judgment 
motion is reviewed for correctness. Trujillo v. Utah Dep V. ofTransp., 1999 Utah App. 227, 
1 12; 986 P.2d 752. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES. ORDINANCES. AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann § 14-2-2 provides: 
14-2-2. Failure of owner to obtain payment bond - Liability. 
(1) Unless exempted under Section 14-2-1, an owner who fails to obtain a 
payment bond is liable to each person who performed labor or service or supplied equipment 
or materials under the contract for the reasonable value of the labor or service performed or 
the equipment or materials furnished up to but not exceeding the contract price. 
1 
A complete copy of the statute, Utah Code Ann. §§ 14-2-1 to -5, is attached hereto as 
Addendum A. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings. 
This appeal is from an order and judgment entered by the Honorable Donald J. Eyre 
of the Fourth Judicial District Court for Utah County on February 15, 2001, granting 
summary judgment to Plaintiff TSS and denying Saratoga's cross-motion for summary 
judgment, R. 395-397, and also from an order entered by the court granting Plaintiff TSS's 
motion for attorney fees. R. 310-312. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Saratoga retained Larry Price Construction to extend and improve a public 
sewer line in Utah County pursuant to an agreement of Saratoga with the Town of Saratoga 
Springs (hereinafter "the Project"). Saratoga had obtained the necessary rights-of-way and 
other permits for the property over which the extension and improvements were to be built. 
Pursuant to the terms of the agreement with the Town, all such rights would be transferred 
with the sewer improvements to the Town upon completion of the work of construction. R. 
354. 
2. Freewheeling Enterprises, Inc. ("Freewheeling") was a subcontractor of Larry 
Price Construction on the project. R. 389. TSS entered into a contract with Freewheeling 
2 
to provide certain rental equipment for Freewheeling's use. R. 353. 389. Saratoga was not 
a party to the TSS-Freewheeling contract. R. 362-372, 388. 
3. It is undisputed that Freewheeling rented equipment from TSS for use on the 
project R. 353. 
4. Saratoga did not obtain a third party surety payment bond, but did set aside 
funds, pursuant to the ordinances and legal requirements of the Town of Saratoga Springs, 
to make payment on the completed work under the contract. R. 353. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The district court's denial of Saratoga's cross-motion for summary judgment was 
appropriate because the payment bond statute affords protection to suppliers of rental 
equipment. This is evidenced by: (1) the express statutory language and application of basic 
rules of statutory construction; (2) the applicable legislative history and Utah case law; and 
(3) the underlying purpose of the Utah bonding statute and the related Federal Statute, the 
Miller Act, broad judicial interpretation of these statutes, and general public policy reasons. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE PAYMENT BOND STATUTE AFFORDS PROTECTION TO 
SUPPLIERS OF RENTAL EQUIPMENT 
A. Statutory construction and express statutory language. 
In Utah, courts "interpret and apply [a] statute according to its literal wording unless 
it is unreasonably confused or inoperable." Gleave v. Denver & Rio Grande Western 
3 
Railroad Company. 749 P.2d 660, 672 (Utah App. 1988). Additionally, when a statute 
contains a general term or phrase, Utah courts are hesitant to narrow the scope of that term 
or phrase. Bleon v. Emery, 209 P. 627,629 (Utah 1922). In Bleon, one party argued that the 
statutory phrase "transfer of ownership" should be construed to mean "transfer of ownership 
only upon the sale of a vehicle." See id. at 629. The Court refused to so limit the phrase, 
explaining that it had to "assume that if the Legislature had intended to limit the effect of the 
statute ... appropriate language to effectuate that purpose would have been used, and not the 
sweeping language that is used." Id. Hence, Appellants5 argument that since the Payment 
Bond Statute refers only to "equipment" and not "rented equipment", the latter must be 
excluded by implication runs contrary to this basic axiom of statutory interpretation. More 
appropriately, absent express language to the contrary, the very inclusion of the term 
"equipment" must assume legislative intent to include all equipment, not just purchased 
equipment. Since the statutory language fails to contain the limitations Appellants' argue, 
the Court cannot assume an interpretation of the statute which limits its effect. 
B. Neither applicable legislative history nor Utah case law support the 
distinction between the terms "furnish" and "rent". 
Appellants further contend that the terms "furnish" and "rent" are distinguishable, and 
therefore the statute's express inclusion of furnished equipment necessarily preempts the 
protection of rented equipment. This argument is simply not supported by the applicable 
legislative history. In 1985, the Utah legislature amended the Payment Bond Statute by 
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passing an act entitled "AN ACT RELATING TO CONTRACTOR'S BONDS; 
ENLARGING THE SCOPE OF THE BOND TO INCLUDE RENTED SUPPLIES AND 
EQUIPMENT OF MECHANICS AND MATERIALMEN." 1985 Utah Laws ch. 219. But 
despite the amendment's name, the legislature expanded the scope of the statute to include 
equipment, not rented equipment. Prior to 1985, the statute only afforded protection to 
suppliers of labor and materials. That the legislature was a bit sloppy is evidenced by its 
failure even to include the terms "supplies" or "rented supplies" in the body of the statute, 
after expressing its desire to do so in the amendment's title. Furthermore, in the 1985 
amendment, the Legislature provided that the remedy for suppliers was the "reasonable value 
of the rented materials or equipment furnished, for the reasonable value of materials 
furnished, or for labor performed...." Id. (emphasis added). If the legislature truly intended 
to bifurcate equipment into two protected categories, furnished and rented, it would not have 
simultaneously provided a remedy for only "furnished" equipment. The current version of 
the Payment Bond Statute affords protection to furnishers of equipment and io "all persons 
supplying labor, services, equipment, or material" on a given project. UTAH CODE ANN. § 
14-2-1(3) (emphasis added). The fact that the current statute clearly contemplates both 
supplied equipment and furnished equipment lends further credence to the proposition that 
the statute was intended to offer broad protection to all suppliers in the construction industry. 
In addition, the applicable case law does not support Appellants' distinction between 
the terms "furnish" and "rent". Appellants cite Johnson v. Gallegos Constr. Co. and Graco 
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Fishing and Rental Tools, Inc v Ironwood Exploration, Inc for the proposition that "the 
term 'furnished' does not include 'rental' of equipment." Appellate Brief of Saratoga 
Springs, 11. Notably, however, these two cases were decided prior to 1994 when the 
Payment Bond Statute only afforded protection for labor and materials. Equipment as a 
protected category was added to the amendment to the Statute in 1994. Thus, these cases 
only stand for the limited proposition that rental equipment is not covered under the term 
"labor and materials" which was the applicable statutory language at the time of the Court's 
decisions. Since the days of Gallegos and Graco Fishing, the legislature has amended the 
statute to afford protection for labor, materials, equipment, and services, 
C. The purpose of both the Payment Bond Statute and its parent, the Miller 
Act, is to protect all suppliers who assist in enhancing a project. 
In 1935, Congress promulgated what became known as the Miller Act. The purpose 
of the Miller Act, 40 US C A § 270 et seq., was to "ensure that subcontractors have some 
remedy if they are not paid, since on public projects they cannot protect themselves by filing 
a lien." United States ex rel Fred's Plumbing & Heating, Inc v SBA, 807 F.Supp. 675, 677 
(D. Colo. 1992). Under 
the Miller Act, "[e]very person who has furnished labor or material" and who is not paid by 
the responsible party "shall have the right to sue on such payment bond [required by this 
section] for the amount" owed. 40 U.S.C.S. § 207b (2002). While the Miller Act language 
limits protection to suppliers of labor and materials, courts have long construed the language 
6 
broadly so as to include equipment and, more specifically, rental equipment. Roane v. 
United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 378 F.2d 40,43 (10th Cir. 1967) ("rental charge for 
equipment used in a public work project" is allowable claim under Miller Act); Moran 
Towing Corp. v. M. A. Gammino Constr. Co., 363 F.2d 108, 115 (1st Cir. 1966) (while 
language of Miller Act is strict, it has long been construed by courts to include rental 
equipment). By broadly construing the provisions of the Miller Act, the underlying purpose 
of the Act could better be carried out. 
Most, if not all, state payment bond statutes have been tailored after the Federal Miller 
Act. Indeed, in Utah, the Payment Bond Statute is often referred to as the "Little Miller Act." 
See Western Coating, Inc. v. Gibbons & Reed Co., 788 P.2d 503, 505 (Utah 1990). Utah 
case law makes it clear that the Payment Bond and Mechanic's Lien statutes, like the Miller 
Act, should be broadly interpreted so as to afford maximum protection to suppliers and 
materialmen who assist in enhancing construction projects. King Bros. v. Utah Dry Kiln Co., 
440 P.2d 17, 18 (Utah 1968) (Payment bond statutes "should be interpreted and applied in 
such manner as to carry out the purpose for which they were created: to protect those who 
supply labor and materials"; of course, today this would include those who supply equipment 
and services, too); First Gen. Servs. v. Perkins, 918 P.2d 480, 486 (Utah App. 1996) 
("general policy of Utah courts is to construe the [mechanic's lien] statutes broadly to protect 
those who enhance the value of property by supplying labor or materials"). 
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The Utah courts' practice of broadly construing such statutes to protect suppliers is 
seen in the early case of J. F. Tolton Investment Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co. In that case, 
the court examined the language of a bond contract guaranteeing payment for all persons 
"furnishing material or performing labor" on a particular project. J.F. Tolton, 293 P. 611, 
615 (Utah 1930). The court interpreted the bond language broadly, holding that "under the 
liberal rule of interpretation to which [Utah courts] are committed", engine rental charges fell 
within the obligation of the bond. Id. 
A holding that the Payment Bond Statute covers rental equipment makes sense for the 
same reasons the Miller Act has long been broadly construed, and is essential to protect those 
who supply rental equipment on public projects. Generally, suppliers of equipment on a 
project may recover for monies owed by either filing a payment bond claim or a mechanic's 
lien claim. Indeed, the bond and mechanic's lien statutes are "closely related in purpose". 
KingBros.v. Utah Dry Kiln Co., 374P .2d 254, 255 (Utah 1962). However, when the owner 
of a project is the state or a governmental entity, the unpaid subcontractor is limited to a 
payment bond claim, since mechanic's lien protection is "not available to those involved in 
public construction projects." Ceco Corp. v. Concrete Specialists, Inc., 772 P.2d 967, 970 
(Utah 1989) (see also UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-1-1 et seq). Thus, if suppliers of rental 
equipment are not protected under the Payment Bond Statute, they are completely exposed 
to and unprotected from nonpaying contractors. Such suppliers would be left with no 
available remedy if this customer fails to pay, while suppliers of construction materials or 
8 
non-rented equipment would be protected by the bond. This defies common sense and 
frustrates the underlying purpose of the Payment Bond Statute - to protect those who supply 
labor, materials, equipment, and services. 
In Utah, the construction industry is booming. A quick survey of construction sites 
would undoubtedly disclose that the vast majority of equipment used on Utah projects is 
rented. A holding that the Payment Bond Statute only provides protection to suppliers of 
purchased equipment would drastically cripple the important equipment rental industry and 
would run counter to the general purpose of the statute and its liberal application by Utah 
courts. On the other hand, a holding that the statute affords protection to suppliers of rental 
equipment would be consistent with applicable Utah case law, legislative history, as well as 
principles of statutory construction and public policy. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should uphold the district court's finding on 
summary judgment that the Payment Bond Statute affords protection to suppliers of rental 
equipment. 
rrrt 
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shall be granted upon a determination by the commission 
^at: 
(a) the promoter of the contest or promotion is properly 
|ensed; 
a bond meeting the requirements of Subsection (3) 
has D e^n posted by the promoter of the contest or promo-
tion; arT 
(c) the^totest or promotion will be held in accordance 
with this cn^gter and rules made under this chapter. 
2001 
13-33-404. Rules foAthe conduct of contests. 
(1) The commissionSffltt adopt rules in accordance with the 
provisions of Title 63, q ^ p t e r 46a, Utah Administrative 
Rulemaking Act, for the comLct of contests in the state. 
(2) The rules shall include a ^ h o r i t y for stopping contests, 
impounding purses with r e s p e c ^ o contests when there is a 
question with respect to the contesqkpntestants, or any other 
licensee associated with the contes l^and reasonable and 
necessary provisions to ensure tha t au^toligations of a pro-
moter with respect to any promotion o r ^ n t e s t are paid in 
accordance with agreements made by the proH^ter. 2001 
13-33-405. HIV a n d d r u g t e s t s . 
The commission shall adopt rules in accordanceWith the 
provisions of Title 63, Chapter 46a, Utah AdmimWative 
Rulemaking Act, for HIV and drug testing of con tempts 
which include: 
(1) provisions under which contestants shall produce1 
evidence based upon competent laboratory examination 
that they are HIV negative as a condition of participating 
as a contestant in any contest; and 
(2) provisions under which contestants shall be subject 
to random drug testing before or after participation in a 
contest, and sanctions, including barring participation in 
a contest or withholding a percentage of any purse, tha^ 
shall be placed against a contestant testing positive 
alcohol or any other drug that in the opinion ofJhe 
commission is inconsistent with the safe and comn^ent 
participation of that contestant in a contest. 
PART 5 
MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIOr 
13-33-501. Additional fee for funding y amateur box-
ing. 
(1) In addition to the payment of a n o t h e r fees or taxes 
required by this chapter, a promoter sh^l pay to the commis-
sion a fee of $1 for each ticket s o l d e r admission to a live 
contest or exhibition which is held u/this state. 
(2) The money collected pursuadcto Subsection (1) shall be 
deposited in the General Fund aj^edicated credits to be used 
by the commission to award y a n t s to organizations which 
promote amateur boxing in tj»s state. 
(3) The commission shaiyfiopt rules governing the manner 
in which: 
(a) the fees requirfcl by Subsection (1) must be paid; 
(b) applications^^ grants may be submitted to the 
commission; and 
(c) the stanyrds to be used to award grants to organi-
zations whiclmJromote amateur boxing in this state. 
(4) Any fundmg available for the purposes of this section I 
shall be nonlajping. 2001 f 
13-33-502, # R e p o r t s to commiss ion . 
(1) Eve^y promoter shall, within 10 days after the comple-
tion of dfj contest or exhibition for which an admission fee is I 
charged, furnish to the commission a verified written report! 
showing: 
(a) the number of tickets sold or issued for the contest 
or exhibition; 
(b) the amount of the: 
(i) gross receipts from admission feesj^Tthout any 
deductions for commissions, brokerage rfes, distribu-
tion fees, advertising, contestants' purses, or any 
other expenses or charges, and 
(ii) gross receipts derived from^he sale, lease, or 
other exploitation of broadcast^rg, motion picture, 
and television rights of such^mtest or exhibition 
without any deductions for dKnmissions, brokerage 
fees, distribution fees, advertising, contestants' 
purses, or any other expe^es or charges; and 
(c) any other matters prewribed by rule. 
(2) The promoter shall, at tbAsame time as submitting the 
report required by Subsectioj/i 1 . pay to the commission the 
fees required by Sections 1^53*304 and 13-33-501. 2001 
13-33-503. Contracts^ 
Before a contest is hJfcl, a copy of the signed contract or 
agreement between t « promoter of the contest and each 
contestant shall be ftda with the commission. Approval of the 
contract's terms a^B conditions shall be obtained from the 
commission as a c^dition precedent to the contest. 2001 
13-33-504. W h h o l d i n g of purse. 
(1) The coimnission, the director, or any other agent autho-
rized by the^rommission may order a promoter to withhold any 
part of a j ^ r s e or other money belonging or payable to any 
contestam, manager, or second if. in the judgment of the 
^commismon, director or other agent: 
fa) the contestant is not competing honestly or to the 
Jest of his skill and ability or the contestant otherwise 
plates any rules adopted by the commission or any of the 
piwisions of this chapter; or 
(bmhe manager or second violates any rules adopted 
by the^kmrnission or any of the provisions of this chapter. 
(2) This sl^ion does not apply to any contestant in a 
wrestling exhibmon who appears not to be competing honestly 
or to the best ofnWskill and ability. 
(3) Upon the withholding of any part of a purse or other 
money pursuant to trrVsection. the commission shall imme-
diately schedule a h e a n ^ on the matter, provide adequate 
notice to all interested pauses, and dispose of the matter as 
promptly as possible. 
(4) If it is determined that a^^itestant, manager, or second 
is not entitled to any part of his\hare of the purse or other 
money, the promoter shall pay the imney over to the commis-
sion. ^ L 2001 
13-33-505. Penal ty for unlawful conflict. 
A person who engages in unlawful conao t^f, as denned in 
Section 13-33-102, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 2001 
13-33-506. E x e m p t i o n s . 
The provisions of this chapter do not apply to: 
(1) any amateur contests or exhibitions of uflkrmed 
combat or any combination thereof conducted by or 
ticipated in exclusively by any school, college, or univer-
sity or by any association or organization of a school, 
college, or university, when each participant in the con-
tests or exhibitions is a bona fide student in the school, 
college, or university; or 




1. Public Contracts. 
2. Private Contracts. 




14-1-1 to 14-1-17 Repealed 
14-1-18 Definitions — Aophcation of Procurement CoA 
to payment ana performance bonds 
14-1-19 Failure of government entit j to obtain payment 
bond — Right of action — Notice 
14-1-20 Preliminary notice requirement 
14-1-1 to 14-1-17. Repealed. 1963,1980,1987 
14-1-18, Definitions — Appl ica t ion of P r o c u r e m e n t 
Code to payment and per formance bonds . 
(1) (a) For purposes of this chapter, "political subdivision" 
means any county, cit>, town school district, public tran-
sit district, special district redevelopment agency, public 
corporation, institution of higher education of the state, 
public agency of any political subdivision, and, to the 
extent provided by la* any other ent i t \ which expends 
public funds for construction 
(b) For purposes of applying Section 63-56-38 to a 
political subdivision, "state" includes Apolitical subdivi-
sion " 
(2) Section 63-56-38 applies to all contracts for the con-
struction, alteration, or repair of any public building or public 
work of the state or a pohtica* subdivision of the state 1987 
14-1-19. Failure of government e n t i t y to obta in pay-
ment bond — Right of a c t i o n — N o t i c e . 
If the state or a political subdivision fails to obtain a 
payment bond, it shall, ur>on demand b \ a person who has 
furnished labor or supplied matenals to the contractor or 
subcontractor for the work oro\ ided for in a contract which is 
subject to Section 14-1-18 promptly maxe payment to that 
person That person shall ha*e a direct r ight of action against 
the state or the political sJDOiMsion in anv court having 
jurisdiction in any count} ^i which the contract was to be 
performed, upon giving written notice to the s tate or political 
subdivision within 90 days from the date on which such person 
performed the last of the xabor or supplied the last of the 
material for which claim is made The person shall s tate in the 
notice a designation of the construction project and its loca-
tion, the amount claimed ana the name of the party for whom 
the labor was performed or to whom the material was sup-
plied The notice shall be sen ed bv registered or certified mail, 
postage prepaid, on the state agency or political subdivision 
that is a party to the contract No such action may be 
commenced after the expiration of one \ e a r after the day on 
which the last of the labor *aa performed or material was 
supplied by such person 1987 
14-1-20. Preliminary notice r e q u i r e m e n t . 
Except persons who are J I onvity of contract with a pay-
ment bond principal or except for persons oerforming labor for 
wages, any person furnisrmg labor, service equipment, or 
material for which a paymeit bond claim ma\ be made under 
this chapter shall provide orehminary notice to the payment 
bond principal as prescribed b\ Section 38-1-27 Any person 
who fails to provide this preliminary notice may not make a 
payment bond claim under this, chapter The preliminary 
notice must be provided pror to commencement of any action 




14-2-1 Definitions — Pa\ment bond required — Right of 
action — Notice — Attorne\ ^ tees 
Section 
14-2-2 Failure of owner to obtain payment bond — Liabil-
ity 
14-2-3, 14-2-4 Repealed 
14-2-5 Preliminary notice requirement 
14-2-1. Definitions — Payment bond required — Right 
of ac t ion — Not i ce — Attorneys' fees. 
(1) For purposes of this chapter 
(a) "Contractor" means any person who is or may be 
awarded a contract for the construction, alteration, or 
repair of any building, structure, or improvement upon 
land 
(b) "Owner" means any person contracting for con-
struction, alteration, or repair of any building, structure, 
or improvement upon land 
(2) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (2)(b), before any 
contract exceeding $2,000 in amount for the construction, 
alteration, or repair of any building, structure, or im-
provement upon land is awarded to any contractor, the 
owner shall obtain from the contractor a payment bond 
complying with Subsection (3) The bond shall become 
binding upon the award of the contract to the contractor 
(b) An owner is exempted from the requirements of this 
section if a person otherwise eligible to file a hen under 
Title 38, Chapter 1, Mechanics' Liens, is barred from filing 
a mechanics' hen under Section 38-11-107 
(3) The payment bond shall be with a surety or sureties 
satisfactory to the owner for the protection of all persons 
supplying labor services, equipment, or matenal in the pros-
ecution of the work provided for in the contract in a sum equal 
to the contract pnce 
(4) A person shall have a right of action on a payment bond 
under this chapter for any unpaid amount due him if 
(a) he has furnished labor, services, equipment, or 
material in the prosecution of the work provided for in the 
contract for which the payment bond is furnished under 
this chapter, and 
(b) he has not been paid in full within 90 days after the 
last day on which he performed the labor or service or 
supplied the equipment or matenal for which the claim is 
made 
(5) An action under this section shall be brought in a court 
of competent j unsdiction in the county where the contract was 
to be performed and not elsewhere The action is barned if not 
commenced within one year after the last day on which the 
claimant performed the labor or service or supplied the 
equipment or material on which the claim is based The 
obligee named in the bond need not be joined as a party to the 
action In any action upon a bond, the court may award 
reasonable attorneys' fees to the prevailing party, which fees 
shall be taxed as costs in the action 
(6) The payment bond shall be exhibited to any interested 
person upon request 
(7) In any suit upon a payment bond under this chapter, the 
court shall award reasonable attorneys' fees to the prevailing 
party 1994 
14-2-2. Fa i lu re of o w n e r to obtain payment bond — 
Liability. 
(1) Unless exempted under Section 14-2-1, an owner who 
fails to obtain a pavment bond is liable to each person who 
performed labor or service or supplied equipment or matenals 
under the contract for the reasonable value of the labor or 
service performed or the equipment or materials furnished up 
to but not exceeding the contract pnce 
(2) No action to recover on this liability may be commenced 
after the expiration of one year after the day on which the last 
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of the labor or service was performed or the equipment or 
material was supplied by the person. 
(3) In an action for failure to obtain a bond, the court may 
award reasonable attorneys' fees to the prevailing party. These 
fees shall be taxed as costs in the action. 1994 
14-2-3,14-2-4. R e p e a l e d . 1987 
14-2-5. Preliminary notice requirement. 
Except subcontractors who are in privity of contract with a 
payment bond principal or except for persons performing labor 
for wages, any person furnishing labor, service, equipment, or 
material for which a payment bond claim may be made under 
this chapter shall provide preliminary notice to the payment 
bond principal as prescribed by Section 38-1-27. Any person 
who fails to provide this preliminary notice may not make a 
payment bond claim under this chapter. The preliminary 
notice must be provided prior to commencement of any action 
on the payment bond. 1989 
TITLE 15 




Legal Capacity of Uimiren 
Interparty Agreements? 
Joint Obligations. 
Revolving Charge AgreemerT 
Prompt Payment Act, 
Registered Public Obligations Ac? 
Utah Rental Purchase Agreement A! 




15-1-1. Interest rates — Contracted rate — Legal rj 
15-1-2, 15-l-2a. Repealed. 
15-1-3. Calculated by the year. 
15-1-4. Interest on judgments. 
15-1-5 to 15-1-10. Repealed. 
15-1-1. Interest rates — Contracted vatjf— Legal rate. 
(1) The parties to a lawful contract ma^agree upon any 
rate of interest for the loan or forbearance^piny money, goods, 
or chose in action that is the subject ofjdreir contract. 
(2) Unless parties to a lawful contjJct specify a different 
rate of interest, the legal rate of mierest for the loan or 
forbearance of any money, goods, q^hose in action shall be 
10% per annum. 
(3) Nothing in this section m a ^ b e construed in any way to 
affect any penalty or i n t e r e s t J n a r g e t h a t by law applies to 
delinquent or other taxes ojmo any contract or obligations 
made before May 14,1981. J r 1989 
115-1-4. Interest on judgments. 
(1) As used in this section, "federal postjudgmenLinterest 
ate" means the interest rate established for the fe^^al court 
System under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1961. as amended. 
(2) Any judgment rendered on a lawful contj^Ft shall con-
brm to the contract and shall bear the interes^Rreed upon by 
Jhe parties, which shall be specified in the ^Bgment. 
(3) (a) Except as otherwise provided byJ^-, other civil and 
criminal judgments of the district co^t and justice court 
shall bear interest at the federal^Bstjudgment interest 
rate as of January 1 of each yeajpplus 29c. 
(b) The postjudgment interej^ate in effect at the time 
of the judgment shall remaj^the interest rate for the 
duration of the judgment. 
(c) The interest or* crim#Tal judgments shall be calcu-
lated on the total amoun^f the judgment. 
(d) Interest paid on^Bte revenue shall be deposited in 
accordance with SectiJn 63A-8-301. 
(e) Interest paid a^revenue to a county or municipality 
shall be paid to th^^eneral fund of the county or munici-










15-1-2,15-l-2a. Repeajecl. 1969 
15-1-3. Calculated\W? the year. 
Whenever in an^^tatute or deed, or written or verbal 
contract, or in any^iblic or private instrument whatever, any 
certain rate of interest is mentioned and no period of time is 
stated, interestiKhall be calculated at the rate mentioned by 
the year. 1953 






fGAL CAPACITY OF CHILDREN 
^Period of minority. 
Liability for necessaries and on contracts 
firmance. 
Limitation on right to disaffirm. 
Payment for personal services. 
Blood donation by minor. 
Disaf-
15-2-1. Period of minority. 
The period of minority extends in males and females to the 
age of eighteen years; but all minors obtain their majority by 
carriage. It is further provided that courts in divorce actions 
^order support to age 21. 1975 
15-2-St^Liability for necessaries and on contracts — 
Hsaffirmance. 
A minor '^bound not only for reasonable value of neces-
saries but ali^kbv his contracts, unless he disaffirms them 
before or within ak^asonable time after he attains his major-
ity and restores to^yje other party all money or property 
received by him by \ m i e of said contracts and remaining 
within his control at a n ^ i m e after attaining his majority. 
1953 
15-2-3. Limitation on right tomisafnrm. 
No contract can be thus disaffirmed in cases where, on 
account of the minor's own misrepresentations as to his 
majority or from his having engaged in biraliQess as adult, the 
other party had good reason to believe the n|uior capable of 
contracting. ^ ^ 1953 
15-2-4. Payment for personal services. 
When a contract for the personal services of a minoWias 
been made with him alone, and those services are afterwl 
performed, payment made therefor to such minor in accof^ 
dance with the terms of the contract is a full satisfaction for 
those services, and the parent or guardian cannot recover 
therefor a second time. 1953 
